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DEMOCRACY, SCIENCE, AND FREE TRADE: 
RISK REGULATION ON TRIAL AT THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Robert Howse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the most common critiques of globalization is that it in­
creasingly constrains the ability of democratic communities to make 
unfettered choices about policies that affect the fundamental welfare 
of their citizens, including those of health and safety, the environment, 
and consumer protection. Traditionally, free trade rules were about 
constraining border measures such as tariffs and quantitative restric­
tions on imports. Increasingly, however, such rules include require­
ments and constraints addressed directly to domestic regulation. For 
example, a country's policies with respect to intellectual property 
rights or its regulatory approach to network industries, such as tele­
communications, may now be fundamentally shaped by rules that are 
made and interpreted at the international level. One of the most visi­
ble and controversial areas where trade rules constrain regulatory di­
versity is that of food safety. The World Trade Organization 
("WTO") Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS 
Agreement"), negotiated in the Uruguay Round and enacted �n 1994, 
requires that countries either adopt harmonized international stan­
dards or, if they choose to maintain stricter regulations, base these on 
risk assessment, scientific principles, and scientific evidence. The SPS 
Agreement also requires that the regulations adopted be the least 
trade-restrictive available to achieve the desired level of protection. 
The above provisions apply even to nondiscriminatory regulations that 
would not run afoul of the Most Favored Nation and National Treat­
ment provisions of the GA TT itself. The SPS Agreement also pro­
hibits "arbitrary" and "unjustified" distinctions in levels of protection 
in situations that are comparable, where these distinctions lead to 
"discrimination" or "disguised restriction on trade." 
Such strictures appear to provide fuel for criticism that globaliza­
tion suffers a "democratic deficit." As two critics put it, "[t]he essence 
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of free trade is deregulation . . . . Trade regimes like NAFf A, the 
GATT, and the WTO already have enormous clout in determining 
environmental, agricultural, land-use, health and, food safety rules."1 
The beef hormones dispute between the United States and the 
European Union may seem to exemplify how the SPS provisions rob 
democratic communities of sovereign regulatory choices. The United 
States successfully challenged at the WTO an EU ban on beef injected 
with natural and synthetic growth hormones. The ban directly re­
sponded to widespread fears of citizens about the risks presented by 
such hormones, particularly if they might be present in foodstuffs at 
levels beyond those that would occur if the hormones had been ad­
ministered in accordance with good veterinary practice. The ban, 
however, was found by a WTO panel not to be based on a risk assess­
ment that followed scientific principles and procedures, a result up­
held by the WTO Appellate Body (on narrower grounds to be dis­
cussed later in this essay). 
The present essay is intended as a response to the "democratic" 
challenge to the SPS provisions and their interpretation by the WTO 
dispute settlement organs. I argue that these provisions can be, and 
should be, understood not as usurping legitimate democratic choices 
for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality of rational demo­
cratic deliberation about risk and its control. There is more to democ­
racy than visceral response to popular prejudice and alarm; democ­
racy's promise is more likely to be fulfilled when citizens, or at least 
their representatives and agents, have comprehensive and accurate in­
formation about risks, and about the costs and benefits associated with 
alternative strategies for their control. If rational deliberation is an 
important element in making democratic outcomes legitimate, then 
providing some role for scientific principles and evidence in the regu­
latory process may enhance, rather than undermine, democratic con­
trol of risk. On the other hand, democracy also requires respect for 
popular choices, even if different from those that would be made in an 
ideal deliberative environment by scientists and technocrats, if the 
choices have been made in awareness of the facts, and the manner that 
they will impact on those legitimately concerned has been explicitly 
considered. 
II. TRADE RULES THAT CONSTRAIN DOMESTIC REGULATION: 
THE CHALLENGE TO THE CONVENTIONAL CASE FOR FREE TRADE 
There are many respects in which enhanced access to foreign mar­
kets can require regulatory changes in those countries, and there are 
1. TONY CLARKE & MAUDE BARLOW, MAI: THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON 
INVEsTMENT AND THE THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY 81 {1997). 
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also the various transaction costs to trade from regulatory diversity.2 
The entanglement of trade liberalization commitments with explicit 
strictures on domestic regulation, however, raises important chal­
lenges to the conventional case that trade liberalization, generally 
speaking, enhances both domestic and global welfare. It had often 
been argued that a country effectively can pursue any given regulatory 
goal by means other than protectionist trade restrictions such as tar­
iffs, and thus, the removal of such restrictions in no way reduces the 
capacity of governments to achieve welfare-maximizing regulatory 
outcomes for their citizens.3 
Thus, in commenting on the original General Agreement on Tar­
iffs and Trade ("GATT") Agreement, conventional trade law scholars 
characteristically have emphasized the extent to which free trade 
commitments do not reduce regulatory heterogeneity.4 The main ob-
2. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY {1995) (especially chapter one "National Regulation in the Global 
Economy"). 
3. See, e.g., E.U. Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem, On the 'Do­
mestic Policy Functions' of International Trade Rules, in 1 THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 121-51 (Robert Howse ed., 1998). 
Economic theory demonstrates that trade restrictions almost always lower the national eco­
nomic welfare of the country imposing the restrictions . . . . For instance, import tariffs not 
only redistribute income from consumers to the protected industries and produce revenue 
for the government, but also create important 'deadweight losses' resulting in a net-loss of 
national economic welfare. Standard economic analysis recognizes only a few narrowly de­
fined exceptions where 'optimal tariffs', 'infant industry protection' or 'strategic protection' 
of oligopolistic industry might theoretically improve national welfare. But these exceptional 
conditions are difficult to establish in practice and are hardly ever actually ascertained in de­
cisionmaking about trade. Most economic arguments for trade protection turn out to origi­
nate in market failures in the domestic economy- such as endogenous divergences between 
private and social costs (e.g. in the case of monopolies and 'external effects') or policy im­
posed distortions leading to inefficient production patterns - which can be corrected most 
efficient by domestic policies intervening directly at and as close as possible to the domestic 
distortion . . .  without introducing additional by-product distortions and unnecessarily re­
ducing the gains from trade. 
Id. at 122 {footnote omitted). While, as has been long understood by free traders {indeed 
since Adam Smith himself), removing trade restrictions has distributive consequences, with 
some domestic constituencies gaining and others losing, the overall gains are greater than 
the losses to the losers, thus allowing full compensation to losers, were such a policy to be 
dictated by the democratic co=unity's relevant conception of distributive justice. See id. at 
122-23. But see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF 
FREE TRADE 180-88 (1996). Such an argument, as Irwin suggests, depends upon the ade­
quacy of the additional wealth generated from trade liberalization to more than compensate 
the losers' loss of welfare. This means that the case that distributive justice can always be 
achieved on the basis of trade liberalization depends upon empirical analysis of the costs of 
those redistributive policies that would be dictated by a given theory of distributive justice, 
as well as of the welfare losses that dictate those policies based upon the relevant theory of 
distributive justice. For an attempt to conduct this analysis employing Rawls's difference 
principle as a relevant distributive principle, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., TRADE 
AND TRANsmONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES {1990). 
4. See Frieder Roessler, Increasing Market Access Under Regulatory Heterogeneity: The 
Strategies of the World Trade Organization, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO­
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT {OECD), REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL 
MARKET OPENNESS 117-30 {1996). 
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ligation of the GAIT with respect to domestic regulations is that they 
be nondiscriminatory either between GAIT/WTO Members (Article 
I: 1v1FN Treatment) or between domestic and imported products (Ar­
ticle III:4: National Treatment). The nondiscrimination requirement 
would seem to leave enormous room for domestic regulatory auton­
omy;5 moreover, in those hard cases where some kind of discrimina­
tory regulation is necessary for legitimate public policy purposes, it 
might be justified under Article XX of the GAIT, which allows the 
maintenance of otherwise GAIT-inconsistent measures that are, inter 
alia, "necessary" for the protection of human or animal health or life 
(XX(b)) or the protection of public morals (XX( a)). 
Something like a nondiscrimination requirement would seem es­
sential to sustain a trade liberalization bargain, even on tariffs and 
other traditional "border" measures; if countries can "cheat" on trade 
liberalization concessions by creating the same protective effect 
through domestic regulations, then confidence in such a bargain will 
likely be weak. The classic economic case for trade liberalization re­
ferred to above tends to downplay such considerations, since that case 
suggests that even unilateral liberalization is economically rational. In 
as much as international trade law, however, reflects the notion that I 
should expect a reciprocal benefit for a concession I confer on others 
(even if it would have been in my interests to confer it absent the con­
cession), some conventions about what constitutes legitimate domestic 
regulation versus "cheating" on concessions seem to be required. 
"Nondiscrimination" has proven to be a relatively robust convention 
in this regard, because protectionism implies discriminatory treat­
ment.6 Once discrimination has been extended, however, to include 
disparate impact, or de facto discrimination, as it has been in GATT 
jurisprudence, the nondiscrimination norm begins to seem like a less 
5. In practice, as Roessler himself admits and as Trachtman d iscusses quite ex plicitly, 
because nondiscrimination requires treating like prod ucts alike, how narrowly the nondis­
crimination requirement constrains domestic regulation d epends upon which products are 
d eemed " like. " For example, if a d omestic product that d oes not create an environmental 
ex temality is d eemed to be "like" an imported prod uct that d oes create this externality, 
these products would have to be treated identically. Thus, this kind of und erstanding of like 
products could greatly constrain the scope of legitimate regulatory activity. See Joel P. 
Trachtman, Trade and . . .  Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L 
L. 32, 65-67 (1998); see also Robert Howse, Comments on Roessler and Wilson Papers, in 
OECD, REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS 165-68 (1996). 
The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has held that the d etermination of 
whether products are "like" for purposes of the Article III nondiscrimination requirement is 
to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, with the relevant factors depending on context. 
See Japan: Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS8/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996), at 19-21 [hereinafter Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages). 
6. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
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stable criterion for distinguishing legitimate regulations from protec­
tionist "cheating" on tariff and related concessions.7 
III. SCIENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SPS AGREEMENT 
On one view of the SPS provisions, requiring that regulations be 
based on scientific principles and evidence and on risk assessment, ad­
dresses the challenge of finding a criterion more stable than nondis­
crimination by making "science" the authority that decides whether 
reg�lations stricter than international standards are legitimate. This 
approach, however, removes the ultimate power of decision from the 
democratic communities that the regulations purport to protect. 
Walker expresses this view as follows: "The central strategy of the 
SPS Agreement is to use science to distinguish between those sanitary 
measures consistent with the Agreement and those in violation of the 
Agreement."8 Along similar lines, David Wirth suggests that "scien­
tific tests lie at the core of the trade disciplines established in the new 
Uruguay Round SPS Agreement."9 If one accepts this understanding 
of the SPS Agreement then there is an inevitable cost to democracy in 
protecting the trade liberalization bargain. If this cost to democracy is 
genuinely required for trade liberalization, then the notion that liber­
alization will generally maximize both domestic and global welfare be­
comes questionable. One answer, which finds strong support in one 
branch of the trade policy literature, is to say that, especially with re­
spect to trade regulations, "democratic" outcomes typically reflect 
capture of the regulatory process by concentrated interests. Thus, 
hand-tying of the political process by international rules, or by an 
apolitical authority such as "science," actually may enhance domestic 
welfare and even result in regulatory outcomes that reflect more 
closely the preferences of most citizens.10 Aside from the questionable 
empirical basis for the "capture" thesis,11 there is another criticism: if 
citizens place a value on the capacity for self-government, paternalistic 
or technocratic responses even to admitted defects in the democratic 
process may well not result in overall gains to democratic welfare. 
7. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Di­
versity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5, 
21-22 (1998); see also Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International 
Trade, 66 U. CID. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
8. Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organi­
zation": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones 
Dispute, 31 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 251, 253 (1998). 
9. David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disci­
plines, 27 CORNELLINT'L. L.J. 817, 825 (1994). 
10. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 3. 
11. See generally Robert Howse et al., Smaller or Smarter Government?, 40 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 498 (1990). 
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Another response is to argue that "scientific" constraints on demo­
cratic regulatory choices be regarded as de minimus substantive re­
quirements.12 Judgments by the WTO dispute settlement organs 
about what constitutes de minimus scientific evidence, however, would 
themselves entail substantive judgments of value concerning the 
regulatory process, begging the question of which regulatory values 
should determine the "minimum." 
A quite different view of the role of science in addressing democ­
racy's defects emerges, however, if one understands democracy not 
simply in terms of popular will and decision, but as a form of legitima­
tion of power that depends on a conception of public justification and 
deliberative reason. Such an understanding of democracy is to be 
found in several important accounts of democratic legitimacy in politi­
cal and legal philosophy, notably those of Jiirgen Habermas13 and of 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.14 Gutmann and Thompson 
provide four reasons why deliberation is a central element in demo­
cratic legitimacy. First, deliberation can contribute to decisions made 
under conditions of scarcity by displaying to those who lose that "eve­
ryone's claims have been considered on their merits rather than on the 
basis of wealth, status, or power."15 Second, deliberation may lead 
citizens to take seriously the claims of others, thus enhancing demo­
cratic equality. Third, deliberation may clarify what is really at stake 
in disagreements between citizens, allowing, for instance, identifica­
tion of conflicts that result from misunderstanding and misinformation 
and that could be solved in fact without the need for trade-offs be­
tween divergent fundamental values. Fourth, deliberation holds out 
the prospect of learning from one another: "Through the give-and­
take of argument, citizens and their accountable representatives can 
learn from one another, come to recognize their individual and collec­
tive mistakes, and develop new views and policies that are more 
widely justifiable."16 
Gutmann and Thompson's version of the deliberative model of 
democracy is not, however, uncontroversial. One issue arises from 
12 See John T. Barcelo, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment - the 
GAIT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L 
L.J. 755 (1994); Wirth, supra note 9, at 856 (arguing, for instance, that the d ispute set tlement 
organs, under the SPS provisions, should confine themselves to determining whether a chal­
lenged measure "qualifies as minintally 'scientific' " ). 
13. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-328 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
14. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1996). 
15. Id. at 43. 
16. Id. 
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Gutmann and Thompson's17 own employment of certain moral princi­
ples they regard as fundamental to simulating ideal deliberation on a 
range of public policy issues, thereby reaching substantive policy con­
clusions which they seem to believe have legitimacy regardless of 
whether they are, or could be, adopted by citizens in a real delibera­
tive process. Thus, Peter Berkowitz suggests: 
What remains curious ... is just how much of their own deliberation -
the refinement of commonly held opinions, the intricate reasoning from 
distilled moral principles, the sifting and weighing of the latest social sci­
ence research - takes place without the actual involvement of fellow 
citizens, in the comfort of the study and the congenial climate of the 
seminar room; and to what an extent the legitimacy of the substantive 
conclusions Gutmann and Thompson reach is, from the perspective of 
their own principles, independent of whether their fellow citizens can be 
persuaded to endorse them.18 
A version of deliberative democracy that responds to this criticism 
would respect citizens' real choices, even where these seem irrational 
as measured against what citizens might be expected to decide in a 
perfectly rational deliberative process, while at the same time seeking 
to make the process as perfectly deliberative as possible. 
The role of science on this understanding of deliberative democ­
racy is developed by Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein: the appropri­
ate role of scientific expertise in the regulatory process is not to trump 
citizens' intuitive judgments about which risks are acceptable and 
which not, but rather to help ensure that citizens' judgments result 
from an appropriately structured deliberative process.19 
As David Leebron suggests, the application of the traditional 
GATT distinction between legitimate and illegitimate domestic regu­
lations may entail a need for transparency in the domestic regulatory 
process. Harmonization through international standards may be justi­
fied where lack of transparency in the domestic regulatory process 
makes it impossible to make a principled decision as to whether a 
given regulation is legitimate or an example of illegitimate cheating on 
trade liberalization commitments. As Leebron observes, "[i]f trade 
liberalization commitments can be neutralized by disguised regulatory 
measures, then the multilateral trade negotiation process would be 
undermined."20 At the same time, as Leebron suggests, harmonization 
17. It should be emphasized that Habermas's version of d eliberative d emocracy is not 
vulnerable to the part icular criticism that follows. 
18. C. Sunstein & R. Pildes, Experts, Economists and Democrats, in C. Peter Berkowtiz, 
The Debating Society, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 1996, at 36-42. 
19. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Pildes, Experts, Economists, and Democrats, in FREE 
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 128 (Cass R. Sunstein ed . ,  1997). 
20. David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization 
Claims, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 41, 65 
(Jagd ish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
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constrains the ability of governments to make distinctive rules for le­
gitimate reasons, and he argues that the SPS Agreement should be 
understood as a compromise or trade-off between these countervailing 
concerns. One might develop Leebron's insight in the following way: 
the SPS Agreement works on two fronts simultaneously: on the one 
hand facilitating international harmonization as a solution to the 
transparency problem, on the other hand seeking to reduce the prob­
lem itself, through a range of disciplines on how governments engage 
in deliberation and justification with respect to regulatory choices. 
If these latter disciplines are interpreted largely in terms of delib­
erative democracy, then it is possible to understand them in the "win­
win" fashion in which nee-classical trade theory understands, for in­
stance, tariff reductions or prohibitions on quantitative import restric­
tions. On the one hand, the transparency21 in regulatory justification is 
needed to distinguish "legitimate" policies from disguised cheating on 
tariff and other concessions; on the other hand, the domestic regula­
tory process is arguably improved or perfected in the direction of an 
ideal of democratic rationality. Unlike harmonization, which implies a 
trade-off between a greater democratic deficit and effective mainte­
nance of the trade liberalization bargain, both democracy and free 
trade should gain from disciplines that enhance democratic rational­
ity.22 
Yet, if one recalls Berkowitz's critique of the Thompson and 
Gutmann model of deliberative democracy, things are not quite that 
simple. Making real world democracy more rational is quite different 
from constructing a model of democratic deliberation that purports to 
tell us what citizens would or should decide if they were to deliberate 
rationally given their existing preferences. 
Moreover, since democracy is not just about citizens deliberating, 
but also deciding and acting, there may be trade-offs within the notion 
of democratic rationality between the need for timely and cost­
effective action, on the one hand, and the desirability of more ade­
quate deliberation, on the other.23 So if one wishes to understand the 
SPS provisions as a "win-win" for democracy and free trade then one 
21. It should be noted that in the GAIT and the SPS Agreement itself, "transparency" 
is used as a term of art to denote transparency in regulations and law themselves, i.e. notice 
requirements. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trad e, Art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A· 
11, T.l.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATf]; Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 ,  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Art. 7 and Annex B, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 69-
81 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] . In this essay I employ transparency in a broader sense, 
above all as transparency or publicity in justification. 
22. Juliet Lodge describes the centrality of transparency concerns in critiques of the 
d emocratic legitimacy of Union-level policy outcomes in the EU in Transparency and 
Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 343 (1994). 
23. On trad e-offs internal to d emocracy generally, see IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC 
JUSTICE 45-48 (1999). 
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must come to grips with this further dilemma. One way of doing so, 
reflected as I shall argue in the decision of the Appellate Body in the 
Hormones case, is to respect the manner in which these trade-offs are 
themselves made within the democratic process of each Member, pro­
vided that these trade-offs are themselves made explicitly, transpar­
ently, and in a manner consistent with the conception of democratic 
rationality. When regulators are acting without the information that 
would be needed to inform rational democratic regulation, they 
should say so and give a reason that is consistent with the conception 
of democratic rationality itself; for example, that the best evidence of 
citizens' preferences is such that the need to avert a possible catastro­
phe through action outweighs the possible gains for democracy from 
greater deliberation. Of course, here too matters are not so simple; 
greater deliberation might change the very preferences that regulators 
are "democratically" promoting in pushing ahead with action before 
deliberation. But, from the free trade perspective, what will be impor­
tant is that there be adequate transparency to permit a reasonable 
judgment that the regulatory choice can be understood in terms of 
such a legitimate trade-off. Nor can this element of transparency in 
justification undermine democratic rationality within each Member 
state (even if it will not solve all the internal conflicts of democracy for 
that particular democratic community). 
And, even if a deliberative process occurs where the requisite ele­
ments of democratic rationality are present, citizens may not change 
their views; once it is known that a risk is negligible or that there are 
significant costs but few marginal benefits, and so forth, citizens may 
still want a regulation to be enacted or maintained. As our considera­
tion of Berkowitz's critique of Gutmann and Thompson suggests, in 
such situations, not to honor the citizens' choice is in fact to favor an 
artificial and cryptically elitist conception of democratic deliberation. 
Yet even here, one could not plainly say that there is simply a trade­
off between democracy and rationality; if citizens believe they need a 
certain regulation, however "deluded" such a belief is, their utility will 
be reduced if they do not get it, in the sense that they will believe 
themselves exposed to a risk they believe to be significant.24 Yet, as 
Steven Breyer suggests, part of the problem in these cases may be an 
absence of trust in the information and judgments that expert regula­
tor/bureaucrats feed into the regulatory process, and part of the solu­
tion to distrust is "openness in govemment."25 This of course suggests 
another "win-win" - enhanced transparency in justification can help 
resolve dilemmas within democratic rationality, while at the same time 
increasing confidence on the part of one's trading partners that they 
24. See infra note 56 and accompanying text 
25. STEVEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 81 (1993). 
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are able to distinguish legitimate regulation from cheating on trade 
concessions. Relatedly, openness can serve to enhance trust between 
one's own regulators and those of other countries and can facilitate ar­
rangements such as Mutual Recognition Agreements, which preserve 
regulatory diversity, while reducing the transactions costs of trade 
across borders.26 
It is from this perspective that I will now consider the main opera­
tive provisions of the SPS Agreement, as interpreted by the WTO 
Appellate Body. 
IV. DEMOCRACY, TREATY INTERPRETATION, AND THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 
The SPS Agreement is, of course, a treaty under the World Trade 
Organization. Not all the Member countries of the WTO are democ­
racies, either in the sense of displaying the formal institutional charac­
teristics widely identified with democracy - free elections, multiple 
political parties, legislative debate and so forth - or even in the gen­
eral sense of providing means of public consultation and participation 
in govemment.27 While an interpretation of the SPS Agreement in­
formed by deliberative democracy might answer certain of the critics 
of globalization, if this reading were not consistent with the structure 
of WTO law in general and also with the international legal rules for 
treaty interpretation, it would risk being characterized as illegitimate. 
To address the critics, it would then be necessary to amend the actual 
text of the SPS Agreement to make it explicitly reflect the democratic 
values in question.28 
The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted the dispute settlement 
procedures of the WTO to entail treaty interpretation based on the 
rules to be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention).29 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides 
26. Under such arrangements, each country can retain its own distinctive regulations, 
while nevertheless allowing imports of goods and services to be sold in its market on the ba­
sis of compliance with the exporting country's own regulations, which are deemed equivalent 
in terms of protection of the public. As Kalypso Nicolaidis points out, such arrangements 
necessarily require trust between the regulators of the importing and those of the exporting 
country. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: Some Lessons 
and Prospects, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD) , REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS 171-204 
(1996). 
27. As John Rawls notes, many countries without democratic institutions adequate to 
satisfy a liberal conception of justice nevertheless have "decent consultation hierarchies." 
See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 61 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
28. For suggestions in this regard, see Steve Chamovitz, Improving the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 
171 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Cambers eds., 1999). 
29. See Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 5, at 10-12; United States: Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Report of the Appellate Body, 
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that a treaty is to be interpreted in light of its purpose and object, and 
its context, including the preamble.30 Additional sources of interpreta­
tion include, inter alia, subsequent practice between the parties with 
respect to the application and interpretation of the treaty, and any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.31 In the recent Shrimp/Turtle case, 32 which concerned a 
potential conflict between trade liberalization and environmental 
goals, the Appellate Body looked both to the Preamble of the WTO 
Agreement - the framework treaty establishing the World Trade Or­
ganization - and to evolving international environmental law in order 
to interpret provisions of the 1947 GA TT relating to trade action for 
protection of exhaustible natural resources. This kind of interpreta­
tion tends to integrate the GATT treaties into a dynamic system of in­
ternational law as a whole. 
It has been vigorously argued, most notably by Thomas Franck, 
that democracy is an emerging right or norm in international law - a 
right that entails not only participation in elections but is closely re­
lated to rights of freedom of association and expression, which facili­
tate democratic deliberation.33 In this broader context of the evolution 
of international human rights law, interpreting those provisions of 
WTO treaties that bear on domestic governance (like the SPS treaty) 
in a manner that supports and encourages democratic governance 
seems appropriate. Democratic governance is, however, increasingly 
seen as instrumental to the achievement of objectives explicitly stated 
as fundamental to the World Trade Organization. The Preamble of 
the WTO Agreement lists as among these objectives, "raising stan­
dards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income ... " and "optimal use of the world's 
resources in accordance with sustainable development. ... " Some of 
the best current economic thinking about development suggests that 
such goals are very unlikely to be attained without democratic govern­
ance. According to Amartya Sen, for example: 
in judging economic development it is not adequate to look only at the 
growth of GNP or some other indicators of overall economic expansion. 
We have to look also at the impact of democracy and political freedoms 
on the lives and capabilities of the citizens. It is particularly important in 
this context to examine the connection between political and civil rights, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996), at 16-17; see also Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
30. See Vienna Convention, supra note 29, at Art. 31. 
31. See id. at Art 31.3.c. 
32. United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (especially para. 129). 
33. See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. lNT'L 
L. 46 (1992). 
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on the one hand, and the prevention of major disasters (such as famines), 
on the other. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to 
draw attention forcefully to general needs, and to demand appropriate 
public action .... This is a part of the 'instrumental' role of democracy 
and political freedoms.34 
Openness and accountability of political and regulatory institutions 
also has been identified by the World Bank as an important determi­
nant of economic growth and development.35 
The growing salience of democracy in relation to the objectives of 
the international trading system, of course, does not provide a justifi­
cation for interpreting the provisions of the SPS Agreement in a man­
ner that does violence to the text of the treaty. Thus, following the 
Vienna Convention, the cogency of an interpretation informed by 
considerations of democracy must be tested against the language of 
the treaty itself, and prior interpretations of the treaty by the WTO 
dispute settlement organs. It is to these matters to which we therefore 
now turn. 
V. "SUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE," "SCIENTIFIC" 
JUSTIFICATION, AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement requires that Members ensure, 
inter alia, that each SPS measure is "based on scientific principles and 
is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."36 Measures 
that "conform to" international standards, however, are deemed to 
conform to this, as well as the other provisions of the SPS Agree­
ment. 37 Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows Members to maintain 
a higher level of protection than that which would be achieved by in­
ternational standards if there is a "scientific justification."38 
The meaning of scientific justification for purposes of the SPS 
Agreement is explained in Article 5 of the Agreement: measures must 
be "based on" a risk assessment, and the risk assessment "shall take 
into account available scientific evidence" of risk, along with a range 
of other factors including "ecological and environmental conditions. "39 
In Annex A, risk assessment is defined as: 
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a 
pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to 
the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of 
34. AMARTYASEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 150-51 (1999). 
35. See generally WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992). 
36. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 2.2. 
37. Id. at Art. 3.2. 
38. Id. at Art. 3.3. 
39. Id. at Art. 5.5. 
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the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the 
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health 
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease­
causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.40 
When read carefully, and in relation to one another, these provi­
sions do not have the effect of usurping democratic judgment about 
risk and its regulation and placing these matters under the authority of 
"science." As language such as "based on" and "take into account" 
suggests, the SPS Agreement brings science in as one necessary com­
ponent of the regulatory process, without making it decisive. Thus, 
"sufficient scientific evidence" arguably refers to the evidence that is 
needed if science is to play this democratic role in risk regulation, not 
to some threshold of scientific proof or certainty below which demo­
cratic judgments about risk are illegitimate. 
In the Hormones41 case, the Appellate Body tended toward this 
kind of interpretation of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body 
(AB) viewed the language "based on" in Article 5.1 as implying the 
existence of a justified rational basis for a measure in assessed risks; a 
measure still could be based on a risk assessment even if scientific 
opinion were divided or uncertain.42 All that was required in the evi­
dence represented by a risk assessment was evidentiary support for 
the connection being drawn by the government between the measure 
in question and the reduction or elimination of the identified risks. It 
is worth citing the AB's analysis at length: 
We do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic 
conclusion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in 
the SPS measure. The risk assessment could set out both the prevailing 
view representing the "mainstream" of scientific opinion, as well as the 
opinions of scientists taking a divergent view. Article 5.1 does not re­
quire that the risk assessment must necessarily embody ollly the view of a 
majority of the scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of 
divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated 
the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty. 
Sometimes the divergence may indicate a roughly equal balance of scien­
tific opinion, which may itself be a form of scientific uncertainty. In most 
cases, responsible and representative governments tend to base their 
legislative and administrative measures on "mainstream" scientific 
opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative govern­
ments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be 
a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources. By it­
self, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable relation­
ship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially where 
40. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex A, para. 4. 
41. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WfO Report of the 
Appellate Body, Wf/DS26/AB/R, Wf/DS/48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones]. 
42 See Hormones, supra note 41, at para. 194. 
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the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to con­
stitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety. Determi­
nation of the presence or absence of that relationship can only be done 
on a case-to-case basis, after account is taken of all considerations ra­
tionally bearing upon the issue of potential health effects.43 
This interpretation of Article 5 suggests a number of important 
implications. It should be noted, first of all, that the AB was here ad­
dressing, at least explicitly, only one kind of uncertainty or indetermi­
nacy, that produced by divisions of scientific opinion. The AB also in­
dicated, however, that the "very existence" of divergent scientific 
views may itself indicate that there is "scientific uncertainty."44 Here, 
the AB seems to be referring to a different kind of "uncertainty" 
which may, but need not be, manifested by disagreement among scien­
tists, namely the degree of error or inaccuracy inherent in assessing 
risk using scientific methodologies. The suggestion is that uncertainty 
in this sense does not in itself prevent a measure from being based on 
a scientific assessment of risk nor by implication, that it is being sus­
tained without sufficient scientific evidence. The AB also suggests, 
however, that when it is rational for a government to act in the pres­
ence of a given level of uncertainty in the evidence will depend, inter 
alia, on how serious the consequences of not acting would be, in terms 
of harm to human health or economic interests, should the higher es­
timates of the risk prove true. Of course, this cannot be a matter of 
scientific judgment; science cannot tell us just how conservative or 
protective it is reasonable to be in the presence of a given level of er­
ror or uncertainty in a scientific assessment of risk. In a democracy, 
this will depend on citizens' preferences about risk. But awareness of 
the existence of uncertainty and margin of error, as well as knowledge 
about the possible consequences of action or inaction, can allow citi­
zens to determine the course of action most consistent with their un­
derlying preferences about risk. To put it in terms of the language of 
the SPS Agreement itself, each country may determine its "appropri­
ate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection."45 Whether it is ra­
tional for a government to take precautions in the presence of a given 
degree or kind of uncertainty in the scientific evidence will ultimately 
depend upon democratic judgments about the "appropriate level" of 
protection. 
The AB's democratic understanding of the role of "science" in 
regulation is also exemplified by its statement concerning the range of 
scientific views that may be taken into account, or even relied upon, 
by regulators in a (democratically) rational regulatory process. The 
43. Id. at para. 194. 
44. Id. at para. 194 (emphasis added). 
45. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 5. 
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AB suggests that this may include "nonmainstream" science. Now if 
the range of views includes these, any sense in which science can be an 
authority or neutral arbiter between legitimate and illegitimate poli­
cies surely disappears - for this authority would depend upon the 
authority of "science" itself to determine what constitutes science. 
And what actual human authority could be found that might make this 
judgment except the scientific "powers that be," namely mainstream 
science itself - for whom nonmainstream science might be indistin­
guishable from magic, shamanism, "superstition," and so on? The 
democratic view of the place of science in regulation is, however, quite 
compatible with a place for "nonmainstream" science; indeed, it re­
flects an older view of the meaning of science: one that predates the 
identification of "science" with the methodologies and techniques 
characteristic of modern natural science - namely, that of reasoned 
inquiry in the broadest sense.46 What is critical is whether the "sci­
ence" in question can contribute to democratic rationality - transpar­
ent deliberation about policy among citizens and their representatives 
that does not exclude from consideration any reasoned claim. 
Yet a further illustration of the democratic approach to the role of 
science is the AB's rejection of a strict separation between risk as­
sessment and risk management - the former based on quantitative 
analysis of risks themselves and the latter involving judgments of value 
as well as fact, in the determination of the best strategy to manage 
risk.47 As the AB observed, 
[i]t is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a 
risk assessment ... is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory 
operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human so­
cieties as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for ad-
46. A meaning that is actually preserved in the range of ordinary meanings, for example, 
of the German word Wissenschaft and the Russian expression nauke. See Jeremy D. 
Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic Tools for 
Regulatory Reform, 43 MCGILL L.J., 835, 857 (1998) ("[S]cientific analysis is valuable in a 
democracy because scientific procedures are systematic and can be well-documented. When 
decisions are made on a scientific basis, they are available for public inspection or review."). 
47. For an explanation and critique, from the perspective of democratic regulation, of 
separation of risk assessment and risk management, see Ellen K. Silbegeld, Risk Assessment 
and Risk management: An Uneasy Divorce, in DEBORAH G. MAYO & RACHELLE D. 
HOLLANDER, ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE MID VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 99 
(1991 ). In a study of the regulatory consequences of an attempt to separate the performance 
of risk assessment and risk management at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) in the 1980s, Silbergeld concludes that such separation 
is deleterious to sound operations and a sense of shared institutional authority and responsi­
bility. When the scientists are restricted from access to policymaking processes based on the 
implications of scientific choices (which are prominent in the resolutions of uncertainty), 
they can only guess how their choices may affect policy. And policymakers, encouraged to 
remain ignorant of science, may misinterpret uncertainty in some of the ways described in 
this chapter. 
Id. at 111- 12. 
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verse effects on human health in the real world where people live and 
work and die.48 
Here, the issue was whether a risk assessment could take into account 
risks that might arise from the use of the hormones in question in an 
abusive fashion, contrary to sound veterinary practice. It was in fact 
this kind of risk that played an important role in the public outcry that 
had led to the EC ban in the first place.49 The Appellate Body never­
theless held that the ban on hormone-injected beef violated the SPS 
Agreement because the European Community had not offered a risk 
assessment that dealt specifically enough with the risks posed by the 
use of hormones in a manner inconsistent with sound veterinary prac­
tice. 
In the subsequent Salmon50 case, the Canadian government chal­
lenged an import ban on fresh, uncooked salmon imposed by the 
Australian government. The Australian government presented, as its 
justification for the ban, a risk assessment contained in a 1996 docu­
ment that found that, apart from heat treatment (which would amount 
to the same thing as an explicit ban on fresh, uncooked salmon), the 
scientific evidence suggested that no other means of preventing the 
risk of the entry of disease agents would reduce the risk of disease to 
an acceptable low. The risk assessment identified twenty-four diseases 
that could . be spread through imported salmonids, with varying as­
sessments of how likely this would be, depending on the disease in 
question. For many of the diseases, the assessment suggested that 
there was very limited evidence on the basis of which one could de­
termine likelihood or probability, and in these cases a very general 
nonquantitative estimate of the likelihood was given. In almost all 
cases, the likelihood was low, but the possible social and economic 
consequences of disease were claimed to be serious enough to justify 
the maintenance of an import ban. This conclusion differed from that 
of a 1995 Report that, having stated the probabilities as quite low, had 
suggested that less stringent precautions might well be indicated.51 
The panel considered the extent to which probabilities of risk 
would have to be specified on a disease-by-disease basis, and asked 
48. Hormones, supra note 41, at para. 187. 
49. See VOGEL, supra note 2, at 156. While the consumers' groups accepted that proper 
use of hormones might address the perceived carcinogenic or genotoxic risk from ingesting 
hormone-fed beef, they believed that the difficulty of actually detected levels in processed 
meat would preclude effective enforcement of a requirement of proper veterinary practice, 
thus leaving a complete ban as the only feasible and effective regulatory measure. 
50. Australia: Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Report of the Appel­
late Body, WT/DS18/AB/R {Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Salmon, Report of the Appellate 
Body]. 
51. See Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, Import Risk Analysis, Disease 
risks associated with the importation of uncooked, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon prod­
uct from the United States and Canada {1995). 
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scientific experts about whether, given the degree of specification in 
the risk assessment, it qualified as such for purposes of the SPS 
Agreement. The answers to these questions reflected considerable 
confusion or uncertainty about what kind of "scientific" judgment the 
scientists were supposed to be making. Some thought that only a 
quantitative assessment could qualify for purposes of a risk assess­
ment, while others found that nonquantitative statements were ac­
ceptable where error levels or uncertainty made a quantitative ap­
proach less feasible. In some instances, inferences across diseases 
might be acceptable, presumably where the pathologies were roughly 
similar; in other cases, it might be necessary to assess the diseases in­
dividually in terms of risk of incidence from imported salmonids. The 
panel concluded, weighing the various scientists' views, that, although 
overall the Report seemed to fall short of the scientific ideal for risk 
assessment, it did contain "some" evaluation of likelihood or prob­
ability. Similarly, there was "some" evaluation of risk in light of the 
alternative measures available to achieve Australia's appropriate level 
of protection, but there was no systematic evaluation of the various 
options and their relative effectiveness in reducing risk. The Appel­
late Body, however, reversed this ruling, holding that, having made 
findings of fact concerning these limitations of the risk assessment, the 
panel could not properly have come to the legal conclusion that the 
1996 Report qualified as a risk assessment within the meaning of the 
SPS Agreement. 
In the questions that it posed to the scientific experts, however, the 
panel never placed the issues in the context of the legal meaning of the 
SPS Agreement provisions on risk assessment and scientific evidence. 
Thus, it asked the experts, inter alia, "what, in your view, are the 
minimum requirements of a risk assessment? Would requirements 
vary depending on the product and/or diseases addressed? . . .  do these 
reports, from a technical/scientific point of view, meet the minimum 
requirements of a risk assessment generally accepted in the specific 
area of aquatic animal health?"52 In asking these questions, the panel 
must have believed either that a scientific/technical point of view 
could be dispositive as to whether a risk assessment met the legal re­
quirements of the SPS Agreement or that a judgment about adequacy 
from a scientific point of view would be at least one element in deter­
mining whether the risk assessment was adequate as a matter of law. 
In the former case, the panel would have actually been ignoring the 
important rulings of the Appellate Body, discussed above, namely that 
52 Australia: Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998), at para. 6.12 [hereinafter Salmon, Report of the Panel]. The 
experts were: Dr. David E. Burmaster, Alceon Corporation, United States; Dr. Christopher 
Rodgers, Fish Disease Consultant, Spain; Dr. James Winton, National Fisheries and Re­
search Center, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, United States: Dr. Maron Wooldridge, De­
partment of Risk Research, Central Veterinary Laboratory, United Kingdom. 
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a risk assessment could contain views from "nonmainstream" science 
and that for purposes of the SPS Agreement, risk assessment and risk 
management are not necessarily to be viewed as separate or inde­
pendent exercises. In the latter case, having considered the scientists' 
evidence, the panel would have to make its own judgment as to how 
that evidence bore upon the legal adequacy of the risk assessment. 
The panel, in any event, did come to a conclusion of legal adequacy 
after making findings of fact that suggested that, from the perspective 
of mainstream scientists, there were elements of inadequacy in the risk 
assessment. So, at one level, the Appellate Body erred in suggesting 
that the panel's findings of fact were not consistent with its conclusion 
of legal adequacy. But, at another level, the panel failed to articulate 
how it intended to use or weigh the scientific evidence in deciding the 
question of adequacy. 
Interestingly, one of the scientists herself expressed some of the 
reasons why one cannot determine the adequacy of a risk assessment 
for regulatory purposes using technical/scientific criteria. In oral tes­
timony, Dr. Wooldridge commented: "very often because time con­
straints and requirements for action dictate that in the given circum­
stances a qualitative assessment, which is generally much quicker, is 
the thing that is required or the only thing that can be done."53 At the 
same time, Dr. Wooldridge, testifying as a scientist, faulted the 
Australian risk assessment for failing to undertake quantitative analy­
sis of probability.54 
In examining the entire record of scientific advice and testimony in 
this case, the naive reader would take away the impression that the 
scientists were terribly confused about what was required in a risk as­
sessment from a technical/scientific point of view. For example, they 
took quite varying views on the necessity for quantifying probabilities. 
But even those who did not think a quantitative assessment need al­
ways be done, strongly suggested, at other points in their testimony, 
that it should be done whenever possible or feasible. Similarly, some, 
but not all, of the experts appeared to believe that an assessment of 
probability would be required for each disease; others hedged on this 
issue. In fact, the scientists oscillated between their sense of what 
would be required to meet a certain ideal of scientific knowledge 
about probabilities, and their awareness that the context of the whole 
question that was being posed to them, was practical - oriented to­
wards political decision and action. 
Significantly, none of the experts called by the panel was a regula­
tory or political economist. It is arguable that the relevant "expertise" 
that the panel needed in this case was the expertise of those whose re-
53. Salmon, Report of the Panel, supra note 52, at para. 56. 
54. See id. at Annex 2, paras. 56-58. 
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search centers on the role of science within the process of regulation 
and who move between the disciplines of science and regulatory the­
ory.ss The scientists called upon in Salmon were placed in a virtually 
impossible position: they were asked to make a purely techni­
cal/scientific judgment about the adequacy of risk assessment as a 
regulatory tool. 
How then, in drawing on different kinds of expertise, might the 
panel have been able to determine the adequacy of the Australian risk 
assessment on a democratic rationality approach? The 1995 Draft 
Report had stated relatively clearly the probabilities with respect to 
transmission of disease and equally clearly the limits and assumptions 
of those statements - many not based on actual historical data. The 
probability was, in almost all cases, low or negligible. In light of these 
results, the 1995 Report recommended consideration of options less 
stringent than an import ban. The 1996 Report, of course, came to a 
different conclusion: that considering the uncertainties surrounding 
the assessment of probabilities in these cases, and given the politi­
cal/regulatory decision to require a high level of protection, the import 
ban remained a defensible and indeed desirable regulatory option. In 
effect, the 1996 Report sought to justify more stringent regulation 
based upon what amounted to much of the same evidence of very low, 
or even negligible, risk. But, in restating the assessment of risks in 
vaguer or more general terms, the 1996 Report, if it did not hide, at 
least blunted the significance of a choice for stringent regulation in the 
presence of negligible risks.s6 From the perspective of rational demo­
cratic deliberation, the 1996 Report, therefore, left much to be de­
sired. It impeded, rather than advanced, deliberation on the essential 
question of whether there are democratically legitimate reasons for 
choosing a very stringent regulatory option in the presence of findings 
of low or negligible risk. In Hormones, the AB suggested that such a 
decision might, in some circumstances, be rational, particularly in the 
presence of various kinds of uncertainty about the finding that risk is 
low or negligible and in light of a democratic judgment on the conse­
quences if, in actuality, the assessment proves much too low. It could 
also be democratically rational in light of citizens' revealed risk pref­
erences in the particular case, which relate to the appropriate level of 
protection (an issue to be discussed in the next section of the Article). 
55. For Breyer' s proposal on the role of interd isciplinary coord inators within the domes­
tic regulatory process itself, see BREYER, supra note 25, at 80-81. 
56. The following claim of Viscusi seems to address the precise problem, from a d emo­
cratic rationality perspective, with the 1996 Report: "tilting risk assessments in a conserva­
tive d irection confuses the informational and d eci si on aspects of research about risks. A 
conceptually sound form of conservativism would have the decision maker (not the risk es­
timator) adjust the weights on the consequences. Adjusting the probabilities amounts to lying 
to ourselves about what we expect." W. KIP VISCUS!, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PuBLIC AND 
P RIVATE REsPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 157 (1 992) (emphasis added). 
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But such an inquiry into the rational relationship between the risk as­
sessment and the measures adopted depends upon transparency about 
the choices made and the assumptions about uncertainty and prob­
ability that inform them. 
The most recent interpretation of the SPS Agreement by the Ap­
pellate Body, in Japanese Agricultural Products,57 appears at first 
glance to endorse a rather narrow view of the requirements that 
measures not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. In 
Japanese Agricultural Products, the United States challenged a 
Japanese requirement that, in order for plants to be permitted to enter 
the country, it must be demonstrated that, with respect to the specific 
variety of plant in question, quarantine measures such as fumigation 
are effective to eliminate the risk of coddling moth, a pest that can 
cause considerable destruction to crops. Japan had produced some 
evidence from experiments that suggested the possibility that effec­
tiveness of the quarantine treatments would vary from one variety of 
host plant to another, and the scientific experts consulted affirmed 
that such a relationship was possible.58 The panel found, however, that 
Japan had not investigated the possibility of a link between the effec­
tiveness of the quarantine measures and the variety of fumigated plant 
studies that controlled for other variables. Thus, it concluded that "no 
evidence before this Panel makes the actual casual link between dif­
ferences in the test results and the presence of varietal differences."59 
Upon appeal, Japan argued that the requirement of a "causal link" 
went significantly beyond the requirement of a rational relationship 
between the scientific evidence and the measures adopted, a relation­
ship the AB held in Hormones was the appropriate interpretation of 
the SPS provisions in question. The Appellate Body, however, upheld 
the panel's finding of a violation in Japanese Agricultural Products, 
noting that the "casual link" did not go to the relationship between the 
regulations and the scientific evidence, but to the weight of the scien­
tific evidence itself. The panel had made a finding of fact that, given 
the absence of any evidence of a causal link between differences in va­
rieties and differences in effectiveness of quarantine treatment, there 
was not a rational relationship between the evidence and the SPS 
measure adopted.60 Moreover, the Appellate Body explicitly rejected 
the understanding of sufficient scientific evidence as a kind of de 
minimus requirement that some scientific evidence exists. 
57. Japan: Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Report of the Appellate 
Body, WTIDS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Japanese Agricultural Products]. 
58. See Japan: Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Report of the Panel, 
WT!DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998), at § VII.F.2.b(ii). 
59. Id. 
60. See Japanese Agricultural Products, supra note 57, at § V.A. 
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How, then, do we understand the outcome of this case in light of 
the democratic deliberation approach to the SPS Agreement, of which 
we found considerable traces in Hormones? As the panel report indi­
cates, Japan never really responded to the experts' view that it could 
quite easily have done more to confirm the hypothesis that varietal 
differences affect the efficacy of quarantine measures. Other than a 
claim to deference, Japan never provided a justification for tabling its 
investigation, even though the United States had raised a presumption 
that the available science could yield much better evidence on the re­
lationship in question, were the inquiry to be pursued. If the evidence 
that Japan had were the best that was reasonably available, or if better 
evidence would have resulted in large costs or inordinate delays in 
regulation, Japan might have been able to supply reasons for acting on 
the evidence which it had. In sum, Japan's choice not to pursue better 
evidence did not reflect democratic rationality. "Sufficiency" of scien­
tific evidence does not, then, refer to some threshold of scientific proof 
or certainty (which, in any case, does not exist in the abstract) but 
rather to the extent of the obligation of a Member to engage in scien­
tific investigation within the process of rational democratic delibera­
tion. And such sufficiency will be judged by the relative costs and 
benefits acting on the scientific evidence that the Member has in fact 
mustered as opposed to having taken the inquiry further. In this con­
nection, it should also be noted that Japan had also attempted to jus­
tify its regulation as a "provisional" measure, which can be undertaken 
without sufficient scientific evidence, within the meaning of Article 5.7 
of the SPS Agreement. Even Article 5.7, however, stipulates that in 
order to qualify as a provisional measure, the Member must be mak­
ing further efforts to obtain more accurate information and must re­
view the measure within a reasonable period of time; it was held by 
the Appellate Body that Japan's measure met neither of these condi­
tions. This omission simply reflects what appears to be Japan's unjus­
tified choice to truncate at a very preliminary stage its investigation 
into the existence of the risk in question. 
VI. APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF PROTECTION 
The SPS Agreement provides that Members may introduce SPS 
measures that provide a higher "level of protection" than international 
standards,61 that, in determining their appropriate level of protection, 
Members "should . . .  take into account the objective of minimizing 
trade effects,"62 and that "each member shall avoid arbitrary or unjus­
tifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in dif-
61. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 3.3. 
62 Id. at Art. 5.4. 
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ferent situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or dis­
guised restrictions on international trade."63 Furthermore, a Mem­
ber's "appropriate level of protection" is defined as the level 
"deemed" appropriate by that Member.64 
The notion that distinctions in the level of protection in different 
situations may be "arbitrary" and "unjustified" relates directly, of 
course, to one of the main issues in risk-regulation literature: the 
question of when it is rational or not for citizens to place a higher 
value on given percentage chance of avoiding one risk rather than an­
other.65 Summarizing important literature, Sunstein and Pildes suggest 
the following: 
For laypeople, many contextual features are relevant: 1) the catastrophic 
nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3) whether the 
risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; ( 4) the social conditions 
under which a particular risk is generated and managed, a point that 
connects to issues of consent, voluntariness, and democratic control; (5) 
how equitably distributed the danger is or how concentrated on identifi­
able, innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to both 
notions of community and moral ideals; ( 6) how well understood the risk 
process in question is, a point that bears on the psychological disturbance 
produced by different risks; (7) whether the risk would be faced by fu­
ture generations; and (8) how familiar the risk is. 66 
Sunstein and Pildes further maintain: "It is fully rational to attend to 
contextual differences of this sort."67 
Even if one believes that in some strong sense citizens' distinctions 
between risks along some of the lines listed above are not rational, it 
may still, in some cases, make sense to "attend" to those distinctions. 
The reason is that the utility from a regulation comes not only from 
the reduced likelihood of an event that one disvalues, but also from 
the psychological security that results from one's belief about the pro­
tection one is receiving. As Viscusi notes, "[w]hen a federal agency 
demonstrates that it will not take chances with individual health, that 
reassurance alone enhances individual welfare. Conversely, a percep­
tion that the government tolerates risks to the public might be more 
damaging than the risks themselves."68 
In Hormones, the AB considered the issue of which differences in 
acceptable levels of risk could be considered arbitrary and unjustified 
and which not. The complainants alleged several instances of arbi-
63. Id. at Art. 5.5. 
64. Id. at Annex A, para. 5. 
65. Compare, e.g., BREYER, supra note 25, at ch. 2 with Sunstein & Pildes, supra note 19. 
66. Sunstein & Pildes, supra note 19, at 133. 
67. Id. at 133. 
68. VISCUS!, supra note 56, at 152. 
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trary and unjustified distinctions between the levels of protection that 
the EC deemed appropriate with respect to the synthetic hormones it 
had banned and certain other substances it had not. Among the most 
interesting of these claims was that while banning injected synthetic 
and natural hormones, the EC had not attempted to control foodstuffs 
in which comparable, or even significantly higher, levels of hormones 
occur in nature. 
Viscusi suggests that people tend to underreact to risks, including 
cancer risks, presented by natural substances, while overreacting to 
those produced by conscious human activity.69 The AB's response to 
the panel finding of an arbitrary and unjustified distinction in protec­
tion as between injected (natural and synthetic) and endogenous natu­
ral hormones was as follows: 
We do not share the panel's conclusions that the above differences in 
levels of protection in respect of added hormones in treated meat and in 
respect of naturally-occurring hormones in food, are merely arbitrary 
and unjustifiable. To the contrary, we consider there is a fundamental 
distinction between added hormones (natural or synthetic) and naturally­
occurring hormones in meat and other foods. In respect of the latter, the 
European Communities simply takes no regulatory action; to require it 
to prohibit totally the production and consumption of such foods or to 
limit the residues of naturally-occurring hormones in food, entails such a 
comprehensive and massive governmental intervention in nature and in 
the ordinary lives of people as to reduce the comparison itself to an ab­
surdity .70 
Yet does this reasoning really save the distinction in level of pro­
tection from being "arbitrary" or "unjustified"? Is it really true that 
the EC does not regulate the level of endogenous hormone residues in 
people's diets because of the vastly greater costs of such regulation, as 
the Appellate Body suggested? Might it not also be possible that the 
differential treatment of endogenous and injected hormones reflects 
the kind of apparently irrational approach to risk described by 
Viscusi? Yet another possibility is identified by Carl Cranor, namely 
that there are morally defensible reasons for this kind of variation in 
risk tolerance: 
[I]t is one thing to die in a natural disaster, such as an exploding volcano 
or an earthquake, and quite another to be a victim of a murder or of a 
reckless or negligent release of a toxic substance. In each case the victim 
is dead. However, human agency and human fault makes a difference in 
our judgments of the issues. Morally faulty human actions are more 
69. See w. KIP VISCOSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY: THE 1996 ARNE RYDE MEMORIAL 
LECTURES 84-88 (1998). 
70. Hormones, supra note 41, at para. 221 (footnotes omitted). 
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blameworthy and frequently of greater cause of concern than acts of na­
ture.71 
If, however, citizens are acting on the basis of a simple mispercep­
tion of relative risks, then the EC, by banning only synthetic hor­
mones, is not only impeding rational democratic deliberation about 
regulatory choice, but is also placing citizens at risk, allowing them to 
draw the inference that a diet that does not consist of meat injected 
with hormones is actually safe in terms of the risks at issue. The Ap­
pellate Body is wrong that the EC would have to regulate endogenous 
hormones through the same means as injected hormones, were the dif­
ference in levels of protection found to be arbitrary or unjustified. 
The EC might sensibly decide that it could respond to citizens' igno­
rance of the relative risks posed by natural hormones through an ex­
tensive public information campaign disclosing the carcinogenic risks 
from the levels of residue in foodstuffs. It might still choose a ban as 
its response to the injected hormones, based upon citizens' concerns 
that because of problems with abusive veterinary practice they cannot 
control the levels of these residues simply through dietary information 
(which would be the case with the natural endogenous hormones). 
In the subsequent Salmon case, the Appellate Body upheld a 
finding by the panel that Australia had based its regulation on arbi­
trary and unjustified differences in level of protection, resulting in 
"discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on trade." In Salmon, it 
will be recalled, Australia had banned salmon imports on the basis of 
risk of transmission of pathogens through live or uncooked fish. 
Australia did not, however, ban imports of bait fish, for which the risk 
of transmission of disease was apparently even greater, nor did it ban 
imports of tropical ornamental fish. Australia argued that it was im­
proper to infer differences in level of protection from the mere fact of 
different regulatory treatment of other fish presenting equal or even 
greater risks of disease transmission. An examination of the record at 
the panel level indicates, however, that Australia provided no alterna­
tive explanation or justification for the difference in treatment, except 
that it had not yet conducted risk analysis for these other fish. From 
the perspective of democratic deliberation, was the Appellate Body 
right to reject this explanation as consistent with the SPS Agreement? 
By failing to conduct risk assessments across the range of comparable 
risks, a government fails to assist its citizens in understanding the rela­
tive costs of achieving a given level of protection in cases of different 
risks. By its selectivity of which risk to consider regulating in the first 
place, a government may reinforce popular prejudices about which 
71. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
AND TIIE LAW 127 (1993). 
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risks are serious or not.72 The Australian government was right to 
point out that a government may not have the resources to study all 
risks simultaneously. Precisely by virtue of this fact, however, 
Australia appropriately could be asked to provide an account of why it 
had acted on salmon prior to bait fish, given that pre-existing general 
scientific evidence suggested a strong prima facie case that the disease 
threat from the latter was greater than from the former. 
VII. NECESSITY AND LEAST TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEANS 
There are at least two provisions of the SPS Agreement that ap­
pear to be very difficult to understand in terms of the process of ra­
tional democratic deliberation. These provisions would seem to re­
quire certain substantive regulatory trade-offs and thereby to 
constrain the outcomes of democratic regulation. Article 2.2 requires 
that each member "shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health."73 One reading of this provision would 
be that it requires that regulations be based on a demonstration that 
less restrictive or less costly alternatives are not available for the pro­
tection of human, animal, or plant life or health. This reading is con­
sonant with Article XX(b) of the GATT, which provides that other­
wise, GATT-inconsistent measures may nevertheless be sustained if 
they are "necessary" to these purposes. GATT panels have inter­
preted the concept of necessity here as implying the idea of least­
restrictive means.74 In apparently excluding only regulations that are 
superfluous or unneeded to achieve the legitimate public objectives in 
question, such a concept may seem consonant with an unbounded 
ability of the democratic community to make legitimate regulatory 
choices. As Trachtman suggests, however, there are interpretations of 
such tests that lead in practice to the imposition of substantive trade­
offs between free trade and other public values. In recognition of the 
fact that even if adequate to achieve the objectives in question, the 
truly least restrictive means may have other costs, such as higher ad­
ministrative or compliance costs than alternative measures; the least 
restrictive means has been understood as that which is the least restric­
tive "reasonably" available. As Trachtman observes: 
72 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate Risk, in 
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETIING BEITER REsULTS FROM REGULATION 135, 
139 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); see also Fraiberg & Trebilcock, supra note 46, at 73-75. 
73. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 2.2. 
74. See, e.g., Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Truces on Cigarettes, 
Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991); GATT Dispute Panel Report on 
U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M 1594 (1991). 
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[I]f the reasonableness test amounts to a requirement that the least trade 
restrictive alternative not be so costly as to countervail the benefits of the 
regulatory measure, then it bears some resemblance to cost-benefit 
analysis; excluding from its truncated maximizing analysis on the meas­
urement of the benefits of the regulatory measure. If, alternatively, it 
amounts to a comparison that requires that the regulatory costs not be 
disproportionately great in comparison to the trade benefits, then it is a 
kind of proportionality testing.75 
It should be noted, however, that there is a significant difference 
between Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article XX(b) of the 
GAIT. The former deals only with the application of regulations, not 
regulations themselves. Thus, the significance of Article 2.2 is argua­
bly that it instructs those applying democratically decided regulatory 
measures to do so in a manner consistent with the public justification 
of the measures themselves. If read in this way, Article 2.2 is entirely 
consistent with a democratic deliberation approach to the SPS 
Agreement. Such a reading makes sense of the treaty language itself.76 
Furthermore, many complaints about protectionism with respect to 
food safety measures have related to the manner in which regulations 
are applied or enforced through border inspections or other enforce­
ment techniques. In Article XX of the GAIT, the parallel risk of pro­
tectionism being embedded in application of measures is reflected in 
the language of the chapeau, or preambular paragraph, which provides 
that, where justified under a specific exception under Article XX, such 
as XX(b ), measures must nonetheless not be applied in a manner that 
constitutes arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on inter­
national trade exists. In interpreting the chapeau of Article XX, the 
Appellate Body has criticized a panel for ignoring the wording "ap­
plied" and not distinguishing properly between constraints on the ap­
plication of measures and on the justification of the measures them­
selves.77 
Much more difficult from the democratic deliberation perspective 
is Article 5.6, which requires that "Members shall ensure that . . .  
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility."78 A footnote to this pro­
vision indicates that for a measure not to be the least trade restrictive, 
another measure must be "reasonably available, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level 
75. Trachtman, supra note 5, at 70. 
76. See the careful parsing of the treaty provisions in Barcelo, supra note 12, at 768-70. 
77. See generally United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod­
ucts, WTO Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
78. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 5.6 (footnote omitted). 
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of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restric­
tive to trade."79 An interpretation of these provisions that would be 
largely consistent with a democratic deliberation-based approach to 
the SPS Agreement is as follows: because Members have complete 
autonomy to determine their level of protection, they are never pre­
vented from regulating unless there is an alternative measure that 
achieves entirely the same result, at equal or lower cost.80 
John Barcelo illustrates the implications of this interpretation with 
the following example: 
Thus it would seem that if the United States were to set a policy of zero 
risk from pesticide Z on apples, it would be entitled to ban the import of 
apples containing only trace residues of pesticide Z. It is difficult to con­
ceive a less-restrictive alternative measure that could fully and precisely 
achieve that objective. If the U.S. purpose were to eliminate risk from 
pesticide Z only, a crude ban on all pesticide residues of any kind on ap­
ples would seem inconsistent with the least trade-restrictive requirement. 
For example if there were a technically feasible, fully reliable, and inex­
pensive test to detect only pesticide Z residue on apples, the Unites 
States wold presumably have to use that test instead of banning all apples 
with any pesticide residue. Such an outcome, however, would not com­
promise the environmental protection goal in any way.81 
Certainly, this interpretation of Article 5.6 is consistent with the 
idea that the SPS Agreement is not about constraining the substantive 
outcomes of a democratically rational policy process. The problem 
with the interpretation is that it tends to render the provision mean­
ingless altogether; a Member will simply set its "appropriate" level of 
protection in such a way as to justify the particular measure in ques­
tion as the least trade restrictive to accomplish that particular level of 
protection. In fact, in one respect, the interpretation is harmful to the 
conception of democratic rationality because it encourages the setting 
of an appropriate level of protection in light of considerations other 
than those reflecting citizens' considered judgments about the risks 
they can tolerate. This concern is perhaps reflected in the Appellate 
Body's rejection in the Salmon case of the notion that the appropriate 
level of protection can or should simply be read back from the meas­
ures that are under scrutiny: 
We thus believe that the SPS Agreement contains an implicit obligation 
to determine the appropriate level of protection. We do not believe that 
there is an obligation to determine the appropriate level of protection in 
quantitative terms. This does not mean, however, that an importing 
79. Id. at Art. 5.6 n.3. 
80. In this situation, there is no possible legitimate benefit from the more trade­
restrictive measure. Indeed, there is a domestic cost, i.e. to consumers, from the trade­
restrictive impact, and there is arguably no issue of balancing because no normatively legiti­
mate claim could be made for the superiority of the measure in question. 
81. Barcelo, supra note 12, at 763-764. 
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Member is free to determine its level of protection with such vagueness 
or equivocation that the application of the relevant provisions . . .  such as 
Article 5.6, becomes impossible.82 
Relevant in this connection is Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement, 
which provides that "[m]embers should, when determining the appro­
priate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into account 
the object of minimizing negative trade effects."83 The use of 
"should," rather than "shall" (which denotes most other obligations in 
the SPS Agreement) in this provision arguably denotes a lesser degree 
of obligatory force. From a democratic rationality approach, this lan­
guage is understandable; it makes clear that Members are not required 
to make a substantive trade-off or to balance (for example on a pro­
portionality basis) gains in protection of life or health against trade­
restrictive impacts. But arguably what this obligation does mean is 
that regulators must attend to the voices of those affected by the nega­
tive trade impacts of regulation, not simply shut them out of the proc­
ess of determining the level of protection. Such inclusiveness is not 
only consistent with, but an important dimension of, rational demo­
cratic deliberation. First of all, welfare losses from trade-restrictions 
are borne not only outside but within the democratic community that 
is regulating. Second, the wider the range of voices that have a say in 
the regulatory process, the more likely certain kinds of errors and 
misunderstandings concerning risk will be avoided. As Jonathan 
Wiener and John Graham note, drawing conclusions from a variety of 
case studies in risk regulation, "[o]ne prominent source of narrow de­
cision-making is what one might call 'omitted voice': the absence of 
affected parties from the decision process and the concomitant dispro­
portionate influence of organized interests."84 Third, and more con­
troversial, is the argument that, since deliberative democracy is not 
only about the representation of the wills of those within the commu­
nity but also about public justifications for policies based on moral 
reasons, it is incongruous with democratic deliberation to exclude 
moral claims that relate to the harm that may be done to outsiders 
from a given policy. As Gutmann and Thompson suggest, 
Representatives need not always, or even generally, pay as much atten­
tion to the welfare of citizens of other countries as they do to the welfare 
of the citizens of their own country. Representatives have enough trou­
ble making public policies that deal adequately with our problems. For 
most of the policies of the welfare state - from health care to unem­
ployment insurance - representatives are probably justified, for reasons 
82. Salmon, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 50, V.E.3. 
83. SPS Agreement, supra note 21, at Art. 5.4. 
84. Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK 
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 230 
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
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of both competence and fairness, in giving priority to citizens of their 
own country. But it is necessary that they be able to justify this priority 
in each case (and that may be less easy to do than is usually assumed). 
To the extent that representatives accept this burden of justification, for­
eigners become moral constituents.85 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The dynamic of globalization often appears to sacrifice democratic 
politics to the demands for greater liberalization of trade. Indeed, 
while they differ on whether it is desirable, both advocates and critics 
of globalization see further trade liberalization as linked to regulatory 
harmonization or reduced regulatory diversity. The foregoing analysis 
of the provisions in the SPS Agreement, a set of liberalization stric­
tures that arguably sacrifice democratic regulation to free trade, sug­
gests that this kind of claim may require more careful scrutiny than 
has hitherto been the case. Where there is a concern that domestic 
regulations may constitute protectionist cheating on negotiated trade 
concessions, an alternative to harmonization may well be to enhance 
confidence in the ability to distinguish legitimate domestic regulations 
from protectionist cheating. Requiring that regulations be defensible 
in a rational, deliberative public process of justification may well en­
hance such confidence, while at the very same time serving, not frus­
trating, democracy. Further research might usefully explore the possi­
bilities of this approach in other areas, such as trade and competition 
policy, where there is considerable resistance by many states to har­
monization, and good arguments against it.86 But claims of hidden 
protectionism will not easily go away. 
85. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 148. 
86. See Michael J. Trebilcock, Competition Policy and Trade Policy: Mediating the In­
terface, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 71 (1996). 
